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Editor’s Introduction
Michael R. Conover
The cost of fear
Michael R. conoveR, Jack H. Berryman Institute, Department of Wildland Resources, Utah State 
University, Logan, UT 84322-5230 USA
No human fatalities occurred when US 
Airways Flight 1549 crash-landed in the 
Hudson River after colliding with a flock of 
Canada geese on January 15, 2009 (Caudell 
2009). More broadly speaking, I am not sure 
the announcement of no fatalities was accurate, 
however. Admittedly, none of the plane’s 
passengers and crew members was killed in the 
incident, but the collision of the aircraft with 
birds will reinforce a fear-of-flying that grips 
millions of people worldwide. As a result of 
this widely-publicized crash, many people will 
now drive to their destinations, rather than fly. 
Statistically, driving places people in greater 
peril than does flying. If one of the people who 
decided to drive rather than fly is killed in a car 
accident, it could be argued that US Airways 
Flight 1549 has suffered its first fatality, because 
someone indirectly has lost his or her life as a 
result of fear created by that airplane crash. 
This scenario suggests one of the more ser-
ious, but unreported, costs of human–wildlife 
conflicts: fear of wildlife. Wildlife phobias are 
common and serious. They include fears about 
being attacked by a predator, bitten by a snake 
or rabid animal, or killed in airplane crash as 
a result of a bird strike. Victims of wildlife 
phobias suffer a diminished enjoyment of life. 
Economists use the term lost-opportunity 
cost  when they refer to the costs of forgoing 
opportunities with a resulting diminishment 
in life’s joys. Lost-opportunity costs caused by 
wildlife also include economic losses suffered 
when someone is unable to take advantage 
of an opportunity because of a problem with 
wildlife. For instance, a farmer may not be able 
to use a pasture for grazing because he is afraid 
that coyotes will kill any livestock placed in the 
pasture. 
Unfortunately, lost-opportunity costs are 
rarely considered or quantified when docu-
menting the cost of human–wildlife conflicts. 
As a result, the cost of a bird strike, deer–
vehicle collision, or wildlife attack is usually 
underestimated. I hope that someday, we will 
be able to quantify the lost-opportunity costs 
associated with human–wildlife conflicts. Until 
that day, I hope that wildlife biologists and 
other people who help to make air travel safer 
have the satisfaction of knowing that what they 
do is important. They help people live better, 
safer, and more enjoyable lives. I cannot think 
of a higher calling than that.
In tribute to them, I am pleased that this issue 
of Human–Wildlife Conflicts features several 
articles on the topic of bird–aircraft collisions. 
These include studies examining techniques 
that can reduce the danger of bird–aircraft 
collisions by modifying conditions at the 
airport and its general vicinity to make them 
less attractive to birds (Ball 2009, Bernhardt et 
al. 2009, Linnell et al. 2009, Hart and Allan 2009, 
Seamans et al. 2009). Other bird-strike articles 
in this issue delve into the issue of collecting 
and maintaining accurate wildlife-strike data 
(Dolbeer 2009, Dove 2009, Klope et al. 2009, 
Peurach et al. 2009) and the responsibilities of 
airport managers (Dale 2009). Several of these 
articles are based on presentations given at the 
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2009 joint meeting of the Bird Strike Committee–
USA and Bird Strike Committee–Canada. 
They also helped fund the cost of printing 
and distributing this issue of HWC. This issue 
would not have been possible without both 
their support and the assistance of this issue’s 
Associate Editor, Richard A. Dolbeer.
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